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Abstract 
This study uses a Linear Almost Ideal Demand System and a Single equation model, to study 
the demand for varieties of wine in Sweden. The data used in the study is open source sales 
data from monopolized alcohol store, Systembolaget, the majority of total sales of alcohol is 
bought at Systembolaget. It is shown that the two models give somewhat ambiguous results, 
however the results from the Linear Almost Ideal Demand System indicates that Red wine is 
a necessity for Swedish consumers and that Rose wine and Sparkling wine are luxury goods. 
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1 Introduction 
The past excessive demand for alcoholic beverages in Sweden is one of the reasons why 
Sweden has the monopolized alcohol store, Systembolaget. Since alcoholic beverages are a 
differentiated goods it is problematic to aggregate alcohol as one good, since the consumption 
patterns of spirits, beer and wine are different (Fogarty, 2006; S. Selvanathan & Selvanathan, 
2005). In 1957 Systembolaget started a campaign to get Swedish consumers to switch 
consumption from spirits to a less ethanol dense beverage, wine (Systembolaget, n.d.-d). The 
consumption shift from spirits towards beer and wine in the last twenty years in Sweden have 
been identified by Trolldal & Leifman (2018). The differences within each category of 
alcohol have also been widely studied, especially wine, which may be the most differentiated 
good within the category of alcoholic beverages because of the wide range of colors, origins, 
varieties and characteristics. Recent studies have used grapes as an instrumental variable 
(Cuellar & Huffman, 2008), or using expert critiques to investigate how customers respond to 
perceived quality (Dahlström & Åsberg, 2009). Others have used the wine’s origin to 
investigate how it affects consuming behavior (Carew, Florkowski, & He, 2004; Davis, 
Ahmadi-Esfahani, & Iranzo, 2008; Friberg & Grönqvist, 2012). However, no other studies 
have studied the elasticities of demand solely within and across the colors of wine.	
Using both a linear Single equation Model and a Demand System approach this study will 
investigate the demand elasticities within the differentiated good, wine. Wine is differentiated 
in the different varieties of wine: Sparkling, Rose wine, Red wine, White wine and Other 
wine, using open data from Systembolaget. Since the quality of the data was both highly 
specified but also missing some information used in other studies (Friberg & Grönqvist, 
2012), such as degree of alcohol, the study has a more general approach than previous studies, 
focusing on the different variety of wine, but still manages to acquire new approaches toward 
the demand for wine in Sweden. 	
Since Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, and the state monopoly to import was 
dropped, the number of importing firms for alcoholic beverages has increased rapidly, 
resulting in a market where the consumer has more choice. The number of available choices 
for wine has been increasing, why it is interesting to seek for a better understanding of the 
demand for wine in Sweden. The objective of this research is therefore to examine the 
demand for wine in Sweden and acquire a greater understanding on how Swedish consumers 
allocate their spending within the differentiated good, wine. However, the demand for each 
wine at Systembolaget would have resulted in insignificant demand, why this study pools the 
data over the total sales of each variety of wine. 
1.1 Aim and delimitations 
The purpose of this study is to examine the demand for different varieties of wine in Sweden 
by using the self-reported price and sales data from Systembolaget. By estimating the demand 
system and the associated expenditure function, the study aims to find a more complete 
understanding of the characteristics of the demand for wine in Sweden. Yearly data collected 
from Systembolaget is used in the study, since the data is highly specific, the differentiation 
within the wine category can be made. No data from the consumption at restaurants, nor 
imported alcohol will be accounted for, in order to avoid measurement errors due to 
heterogeneous datasets. Since average income information for 2018 were not available at the 
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time of the study, the income effects will, therefore, not be studied. Further limitations 
regarding the data is explained in the chapter of data management. 
1.2 Structure of the report 
This study will have the following structure: first, the method of both models used will be 
discussed and explained in Chapter Two. Second, in Chapter Three a historical background of 
Systembolaget will be discussed, to get a greater understanding of the nature of the Swedish 
alcohol monopoly. Furthermore, in Chapter Three, previous studies will be presented, 
reviewed and discussed. Third, the data management and the econometric methods will be 
explained in Chapter Four. Fourth, the results and their following discussion will be presented 
in Chapter Five. Finally, Chapter Six outlines a conclusion and discussion of further research. 
3 
2 Theoretical perspective and literature review 
In the following chapter a brief background of the Swedish monopoly and an outline of how 
the Swedish monopoly is operating today. Which will be followed by a literature review 
focusing on alcohol demand with system approach, but also explaining the taxation of alcohol 
in Sweden and consumption trends.  
2.1 Systembolaget – History of the monopoly 
The Swedish monopoly of the distribution of alcoholic beverages have a history from the 
extensive alcoholic problems in the 19th century. However, the state-owned store for alcoholic 
beverages, Systembolaget, as we know it today dates back to 1955, when the state-owned 
country wide Systembolaget opened. Until Sweden entered the European Union in 1995, not 
only was the distribution a government monopoly but also the only firm allowed to import, 
called ‘Vin och Sprit AB’ (Systembolaget, n.d.-b). 	
Extensive criticism against Systembolaget started on New Year’s Eve 1991, and the 
government subsequently started an investigation as a working ground for adjustments needed 
for the upcoming election for entering the European Union (Systembolaget, n.d.-f). 	
There were suspicions from the European Commission that Systembolaget and Vin och Sprit 
AB might discriminate among the imported goods. However, in 1994 the Commission found 
that the distributions in the stores all over the country were not discriminating. Vin och Sprit 
AB lost the monopoly status and from 1995 there are over one hundred importing firms. 
Systembolaget also lost the monopoly to distribute to restaurants in 1995, and restaurants can, 
therefore, import directly through any import firm (Systembolaget, n.d.-f).	
In 2019, Systembolaget has 436 brand stores, outlets and customers can also order to 
approximately 470 local agents, such as a supermarket, without additional costs. The local 
agents can only distribute what is ordered by customers and have no stocks (Systembolaget, 
n.d.-c). Since 2012, Systembolaget has offered home delivery as a test to follow the consumer
patterns of the citizens and increase the level of service especially for consumers with long
distances to an outlet or local agent (Regeringskansliet, 2018). After reports of no increase in
the alcohol consumption, the home delivery has been proposed to become part of the standard
operating procedures for Systembolaget. The price setting and the access to alcoholic
beverages is the same in all stores and have no local variations.
In the outlets, the fixed range of different products is approximately 2,500 varieties, with the 
range in each store depending on the demand in each outlet. The fixed range represents 95% 
of the total sales. In addition to the fixed range, Systembolaget also has a range of products 
which are available to order both from the store but also from the internet and will be 
delivered to the outlet selected by the customer. This online range consists of around 13,500 
items. Additionally, there is also a temporary range consisting of 1,500 items which consists 
of seasonal, small scale locally produced and exclusive range, with a relatively high price and 
in limited volumes. Consumers can also privately import from other countries through 
Systembolaget (Systembolaget, 2018). 	
Besides the monopoly, there are multiple other instruments to control the alcohol 
consumption in Sweden. The two administrative instruments are limiting sales and 
accessibility. Sales are limited through a strict non-tolerance towards encouraging additional 
sales and volume discounts, nor do they have any loyalty club. Furthermore, Systembolaget 
offers a return policy which provides the customer with the possibility to return what is 
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unopened and unconsumed. Accessibility is restricted through the limited number of 
salespoints, opening hours and the age limit of 20 to purchase alcohol. The age limit to drink 
alcohol on premises at a bar or restaurant is the same as the legal age, 18 years 
(Systembolaget, n.d.-e).	
2.2 Previous studies 
Previous elasticity studies study wine as a homogenous good in relation to spirits and beer or 
alcohol as a homogenous good in relation to other food stuff that is consumed at home 
(Fogarty, 2006; Mitchell, 2016; S. Selvanathan & Selvanathan, 2005). When making a  
Using a source-differentiated AIDS approach, Carew et al. (2004) studied the demand for 
table wine in British Columbia. The Canadian wine production is on the rise from a 
monoculture within the wine sector in 1930-1980 towards a more diversified wine production 
with a large variety of grapes and wine. Carew et al. used the source differentiated AIDS 
model to estimate the differences in demand on domestic and imported Red and White wine. 
Assuming two stage budgeting process and weak separability between goods, they conclude 
that the demand elasticities are inelastic for most of the Red wines and White wine from 
British Columbia and Europe whereas the White wine from the rest of the world is elastic. 
They find substitute relations vary between wines of different regions.  
Alley et al. (1992) also apply an AIDS approach on the demand for alcoholic beverages in 
British Columbia. Including six product categories, Wine produced in British Columbia, 
imported wine from US, other imported wine, also including other Canadian wines from 
outside British Columbia, beer, spirits and other goods. Using monthly sales data from April 
1981 to August 1986 provided by the British Columbia Liquor Distribution Branch and a CPI 
for Vancouver as a price setting for other goods than alcohol.  
With the main goal of reaching a greater understanding about the demand for Australian 
wines in the US, Davis et al. (2008) uses a nested logit model to explain the demand for wine 
under product differentiation. They argue that most of the AIDS models in previous studies 
have some flaws, meaning that the aggregating wine at product level and assuming restrictive 
markets makes them unsuitable to capture the true effects and the disequilibria. Also, the 
problem that most studies do not differentiate the different attributes of wine. Davis et al. uses 
sales data from groceries and drugstores over 3 consecutive years, 2003-2005. The data 
corresponds to approximately 52 percent of the total US sales, they selected the 50 top brands 
in the US market. Even though all 50 brands were not available in all stores they argue that 
this does not affect their analysis. They nested over quality and region of origin, the quality is 
defined by price segments, they argue that the price is a reasonable proxy for the quality of 
the wine. Davis et al. argues that wine knowledge is increasing with the quality, which creates 
a more homogenous group of consumers. The consumer in the lower qualities have less wine 
knowledge, in combination with a larger supply they are a much more heterogeneous group. 
Therefore, pricing is not the most efficient tool to compete on the US market of wine, since 
the consumers of the lowest qualities cannot differentiate as much as in the higher quality 
groups. 
Gruenewald et al. (2006) have looked at quality substitutions and price elasticities for the 
different categories of alcohol in Sweden. The monthly data provided by Systembolaget let 
them account for seasonal sales differences and the number of public holidays and Fridays. 
Differentiating the complex good alcohol into high, medium and low quality, within each 
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category, beer, wine and spirits. Each quality account for one third of the total ethanol sales 
for each category. Their research shows how consumers substitute both between quality 
segments as well as between beverage categories. The results indicate that consumers are 
more likely to adapt to price changes by substitution rather than reducing their consumption. 
They conclude that an efficient way to decrease alcohol consumption would be to increase 
prices on low quality alcohol. However, Sundén (2019) argues that an increase on the low 
quality alcohol would add a threshold that would have an effect only on consumers who 
consumes the least expensive alcohol and not an effect that would decrease the consumption 
over all.  
Ceullar et al. (2010) uses both a Fixed Effect Model and an instrumental approach to study 
the demand for wine in the United States. Using monthly data of 750 ml bottles from grocery 
stores from all over the US. Per capita disposable income is used as income variable over the 
years 2002-2005. Their instrumental variable is the grape price data provided by the 
Californian department of Food and Agriculture. Grapes are the main ingredient in wine 
however they conclude that the grapes only account for 10 percent of the total price why their 
instrument might be questioned. The disaggregation made in the article is that wines are 
estimated by color and by the 6 most selling Red and White wines. They also make the 
distinction in price points below and above $10 which is a rather arbitrary chosen price. They 
found that Red wine drinkers are more willing to switch to White wines than White wine 
drinkers are to switch to Red. 
2.2.1 Taxation of alcohol – controlling the consumption 
There is no doubt that increasing taxation of alcohol will reduce the consumption, to which 
extent depends on the monitoring set in place by the government (Babor et al., 2010). 
Consuming alcohol has a large impact on multiple parts of the body and the economy, every 
year the consumption of alcohol contributes to over 3 million deaths, or approximately 5% of 
all deaths worldwide. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has launched an initiative to 
reduce the harmful use of alcohol by 10% by 2025 since the alcohol consumption in the world 
is increasing. Pricing, restrict or ban or increase the prices of alcoholic beverages are the most 
efficient intervention to decrease alcohol consumption and the core objectives of the initiative 
(World Health Organization & Management of Substance Abuse Team, 2018). 	
In Sweden the taxation of alcohol is differentiated between the beverage categories. From 
2017-01-01 the tax levels for wine is untaxed below 2,25 percent and from 2,25 percent to 18 
percent the tax is ranging from 9,19 to 54,79 kronor per liter (Skatteverket, n.d.). Over the 
time period of this study the tax levels for alcoholic beverages have changed 3 times, in 2011 
they increased by 7 percent, in 2015 they increased by 9 percent and in 2017 they increased 
by 4 percent, for wine (Skatteverket, n.d.). This may have an effect on both prices and total 
sales which is not accounted for in this study due to the lack of data on ethanol level in the 
open data provided by Systembolaget.	
2.2.2 Consumption trends in Sweden 
The consumption trend according to self-reported survey data and sales data from 
Systembolaget indicate that the consumption of spirits is decreasing while the wine 
consumption is increasing. Beer on the other hand has had a rather steady level of 
consumption for the last 10 years. Approximately 62,8 percent of the total consumption of 
alcoholic beverages is bought at Systembolaget and 13,5 percent is bought abroad. 10,2 
percent of the alcoholic beverages are consumed at restaurants and bars. These estimations are 
based on a yearly survey with a randomly selected sample size of 1.500 people per month, in 
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total 18.000 participants who estimate their consumption the last 30 days (Trolldal & 
Leifman, 2018). 	
A number of measurement errors is connected to these estimations, since people tend to 
underestimate their consumption of alcohol. Multiple studies about alcohol address this 
problem and that policies concerning alcohol are based on potentially very biased data (Cook 
& Moore, 2000; Room, 2004). In a recent report about the Swedish sin taxes for alcohol, 
tobacco and gaming in terms of monetary games, the statistics is clearly questioned. The lack 
of consistent quality statistics makes it difficult to investigate the true effects of the policies 
and the true costs related to consumption of alcohol, tobacco and gaming (Sundén, 2019). 
How changes in foreign taxes affect the cross-price elasticities have been studied using 
municipality data on consumption and distance to borders as well as the number of outlets per 
capita. The results show that the demand for alcohol in Systembolaget’s outlets depend on the 
distance to neighboring countries with lower prices, resulting in reduced tax revenues for 
Sweden (Asplund, Friberg, & Wilander, 2007).	
2.2.3 Is wine a luxury good or a normal good? 
In the study by Lööv and Widell (2009) the AIDS model is used to estimate the demand for 
food in Sweden. Even if they exclude alcoholic beverages from their analysis, they still 
assume alcohol as a commodity group to be a luxury good. However other studies show that 
both wine and beer is considered as a necessity and only spirits should be considered as a 
luxury good (S. Selvanathan & Selvanathan, 2005). Fogarty (2009) makes it clear that wine is 
much more heterogeneous than both beer and spirits, why a classification of the category as a 
whole may lead to a misleading statement. In the study about price sensitivity for perceived 
quality in wine, Dahlström and Åsberg (2009) estimates that for some price segments of wine, 
wine is a luxury good.  
Most studies within the field of wine economics and demand analysis it can be concluded that 
almost ideal demand system approach is more frequently than other demand systems, as 
previously mentioned. The available data for alcohol consumption in Sweden is rather scanty 
which might be surprising since the instruments for alcohol consumption in Sweden are strict 
compared to the rest of the world.   
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3 Method 
The demand models used in this study is based on Neoclassical demand theory. Individuals 
are assumed to be rational and are always seeking to maximize their utility given their 
available income (Varian, 2010).  
3.1 Separability 
When estimating the demand for any good, the ideal demand system would include the 
consumption in relation to all expenditure, a complete demand system. However, this would 
require a large amount of data from different data sources in combination with thousands of 
equations which would be both very expensive and almost impossible. Making some a priori 
assumption of the consumer’s preferences is the most commonly used way of going about this 
problem. The assumption of a multi stage budgeting process and weak separability are two 
common assumptions (Edgerton et al., 1996). The two-stage budgeting process is explained 
as follows: ‘This approach implies that goods can be divided into a number of “separate” 
groups, where a change of price in a good in one group affects the demand for all goods in 
another group in the same manner.’ (Edgerton et al., 1996, p. 69). The two-stage budgeting 
process, Figure 1 implies that consumers in the first stage allocate the total expenditure for 
Animalia, Beverages, Vegetablia and Miscellaneous and in the second stage the allocate how 
much to spend on soft drinks, hot drinks and alcoholic drinks. Applying a separable demand 
system is logic since a consumer is more likely to compare the good with similar goods, 
rather than other goods or services.  
Figure 1 Utility tree (Edgerton et al., 1996, p. 7) 
In the four-stage budgeting process applied in this study, Figure 2, is an extension of Figure 1 
which resembles the one provided by Carew, et al. (2004). Where the third stage is the 
decision of consuming wine, beer or spirits and the fourth stage which category of wine, 
Sparkling, Rose, Red, White or Other. The utility tree in Figure 2 also resembles the utility 
tree used in Edgarton et al. (1996, p. 206) for forecasting food consumption in Finland. 
Stage 2
Stage 1
Private 
Consumption 
Food-at-Home
Animalia
Meat
Fish
Milk, egg and 
cheese
Beverages
Soft drinks
Hot drinks
Alcoholic Drinks
Vegetablia
Bread and Cereals
Fruit and 
vegetables
Potatoes
Miscellaneous
Fat and Oils
Sugar
Confectionery
Restaurants and 
Cafés Non-Durables Service
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Figure 2 Utility tree used in this study 
3.2 Single equation model 
The estimated model is a Single equation Model applied on the pooled data inspired by 
Cuellar & Huffman (2008), since no instrumental variable is applicable the following model 
will be applied: 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠()) = 𝛼( + 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝑃()) + 𝜃𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒( + 𝜀() (1) 
Where 𝑖	 is the variety of wine, 𝑡	is year, 𝑅𝑃() is the Real price, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	  is the Single equation 
for year 𝑡 and 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠() = 𝑅𝑃() ∗ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠().  
𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠()) = 𝛼( + 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝑃()) + ∑ 𝛿=𝐷𝑈𝑀= ∗ 𝑙𝑛A𝑅𝑃=)BC=DE + ∑ 𝛾=𝐷𝑈𝑀=C=DE + 𝜃𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒( +	𝜇= +𝑢()  (2) 
Where 𝜇= are other control variables, subscript 𝑗 = 1 is activated by Red, 𝑗 = 2 by Sparkling, 𝑗 = 3 by Rose, j=5 by White and 𝑗 = 5 by Other wine. 𝐷𝑈𝑀= is a dummy variable which 
takes 1 for wine 𝑗 and zero otherwise. 
Assuming the following fixed effects regression assumptions, notation from Stock and 
Watson (2015, p. 412): 
1. 𝜀()/𝑢() has a conditional mean zero: 𝐸(𝜀()	/𝑢()	|RPRS, … , 𝑅𝑃(V, 𝛼() = 0
2. RPRS, … , 𝑅𝑃(V, 𝛼(, … , 𝛼V)Are i.i.d. draws drom their joint distribution.
3. Large outliers are unlikely: ((𝑅𝑃(V, 𝛼()
4. There is no perfect multicollinearity.
Stage 4
Stage 3
Stage 2
Stage 1 Beverages
Softdrinks Hotdrinks Alcoholic Drinks
Wine 
Sparkling Rose Red White Other
Beer Spirits
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3.2.1 Elasticities 
The estimated 𝛽 provides an estimate of the price elasticity on the demand for wine since the 
estimated model is a log-log model, however since the elasticities estimated in the model are 
own price elasticities, it is required to subtract 1. 
XYZ([\Y]^_`)XYZ(ab_`) = XYZ(cd\Z)()(]^_`)XYZ(ab_`) + XYZ(ab_`)XYZ(ab_`) (3) XYZ(cd\Z)()(]^_`)XYZ(ab_`) = 𝛽 − 1 (4) 𝛽 is the coefficient associated with the price of reference wine. 
The own price elasticity for the reference wine (red) is as follows: 𝛽 − 1 (5) 
For the other wine of category j, the own price elasticity is as follows: 
 𝛽 − 1 + 𝛿= (6) 
Taking the example of Sparkling wine for the model specification appearing in column (3) of 
Table 3, the own price elasticity is as follows:  
0.487-1-0.698= -1.211 
3.3 Almost Ideal Demand System, AIDS 
The demand system which will be used in this study is the Linear Almost Ideal Demand 
System, L/AIDS, which is a linear version of the Almost Ideal Demand System, AIDS, first 
introduced by Deaton and Meullbauer (1980). This method has been more commonly used in 
recent studies regarding the demand for alcohol and wine. L/AIDS have been applied more 
frequently than the AIDS (Edgerton et al., 1996). One aspect of why this is the case, which 
holds true in this study is that L/AIDS is suitable for different categories, since it has a wide 
range and is flexible.  
The Rotterdam Demand Model is another differential demand system first developed by 
Barten (1964) and Theil (1965). The Rotterdam Demand Model has primarily been used to 
estimate the correlation between advertising and demand or when making cross-country 
comparisons within the field of wine economics or alcohol demand (Duffy, 1987; E. A. 
Selvanathan, 1991; S. Selvanathan & Selvanathan, 2005). 
Damaeus et al. (2002) argues that researchers have the tendency to just pick one model over 
the other, which is why they estimated both an AIDS model and a Rotterdam Demand model, 
with the same data in order to find the differences and to find if any model is more favorable. 
The results indicate that the Rotterdam Demand Model is preferred to the AIDS model. 
Barnett and Seck (2008) compared the two models and argues that when estimating consumer 
demand on an aggregate level, the higher the aggregate, the lower the elasticity of 
substitution. They found that Rotterdam Demand Model yields more accurate elasticities 
whereas AIDS may classify substitutes as compliments or overestimate the elasticities. 
However, in a review of the usage of the Rotterdam Demand Model conducted by Clements 
& Gao (2015) it is clear that the number of papers using the Rotterdam Demand Model to 
estimate consumer behavior is inferior to other models especially AIDS and Linear 
Expenditure System. 
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The AIDS model for the 𝑖th good, expressed in budget share form proposed by Deaton and 
Meullbauer (1980): 𝑠() = 𝛼( + ∑ 𝛾(=Z=Df ln	(𝑝=)) + 𝛽( ln ja`b` k (7) 
for 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛, 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛		𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑡 = 2009,… , 2018 𝑠( is the budget share of the of the 𝑖th commodity, 𝑝= is price and 𝑅  the total expenditure on 
the purchase of different varieties of wine, 𝛾 and 𝛽 are parameters which describes changes in 
the budget shares captured from changes in prices and expenditure. 𝑃)   is a price index 
defined by:  ln(𝑃)) = 𝛼p + ∑ 𝛼=Z=Df lnA𝑝=)B + fE∑ ∑ 𝛾(=Z=DfZ(Df ln(𝑝()) lnA𝑝=)B (8) 
To respect the Engel conditions, the following restriction is imposed: ∑ 𝛽( = 0Z(Df   (9) 
The following restrictions ensure the normal properties of adding up, homogeneity and 
symmetry: ∑ 𝛼= = 1Z(Df   (10) ∑ 𝛾(= = 0	∀𝑗Z(Df   (11) 
Homogeneity requires:  ∑ 𝛾(= = 0	∀𝑖Z=Df   (12) 
Symmetry is satisfied if the following constraint is satisfied: 	𝛾(= = 𝛾=( (13) 
Expression (8) is replaced by a Stone price index, which has the advantage of simplifying the 
implementation of the AIDS model. The Stone price index is given by the following 
expression:  ln(𝑃)∗) = ∑ 𝑠()Z(Df ln(𝑝()) (14) 
Replacing ln(Pt) by the Stone price index formulation in  in (7) results in the following 
L/AIDS model: 𝑠() = 𝛼( + 𝛼f𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + ∑ 𝛾(=Z=Df ln	(𝑝=)) + 𝛽( ln ja`b`∗k (15) 
Since the L/AIDS budget shares sum to one, one must be excluded when estimating (n-1) 
such as maximum likelihood and/or iterative seemingly unrelated estimation procedures. 
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These two estimation procedures are asymptotically equivalent and are invariant with respect 
to the dropped budget share equation. 
3.3.1 Elasticities 
The following elasticities equations concerning the L/AIDS model are developed from the 
notation of Alston et al (1994). The uncompensated or Marshallian price elasticity, 
Marshallian elasticity, is a function of the own price elasticity and the other elasticities, which 
is why the equation in (16) will give a matrix of 𝑛E, where 𝑛 is the number of observations.  
Marshallian elasticity is derived from utility maximization, subject to a budget restraint. 𝜂(= = −𝛿(= + s_t^_ − u_^_ 𝑠= (16) 
The elasticities are only accounted for in the group, wine, where the total expenditure within 
the group is constant and all other prices in the other groups are held constant, (𝑃v, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗). 
Where 𝛿(= is Kronecker’s delta, equaling one if 	𝑖 = 𝑗 and zero otherwise.  
Expenditure elasticity is computed as follows: 𝜇( = 1 + u_^_  (17) 
The compensated elasticity function, Hicksian elasticity of the L/AIDS model, derived from 
the expenditure minimization subject to a fixed utility level: 𝜂(=∗ = 𝜂(= + 𝑠= j1 + u_^_k (18) 
3.4 Model testing 
In order to test the L/AIDS model, multiple tests can be applied such, Likelihood ratio tests 
and Chi squared tests. Since the sample size is small and the number of equations is small, 
both Chi squared can be applied with less risk of biased test results. Rao’s F-test would have 
been used if the number of estimated equations would have been greater than 5 (Edgerton et 
al., 1996). 
The Durbin Watson test is applied to all the L/AIDS equations to check for first-order 
autocorrelation among the residuals of the L/AIDS demand equations.  following if Durbin 
Watson is close to 0. A likelihood test can be estimated in order to check for autocorrelation. 
The Durbin Watson 𝑑 statistic is expressed as follows:  𝑑 = ∑ (û`zû`{|)}`~`~}∑ û}``~`~| (19) 
The nominator is the sum of the squared differences and the denominator is the sum of 
squared residuals. 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 4 and if equal to 2, the equation has no serial correlations. If the 
Durbin Watson is within 1.5-2.5 the acceptable range to reject autocorrelation (Gujarati, 
2003).  
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All the applied restrictions to the model will be tested, to account for adding up, homogeneity 
and symmetry.  
In the Single equation model both t-test and F-test are conducted to test for joint hypothesis. 
Testing the null hypothesis that consumers have no preferences in the variety of wine when 
consuming wine.  𝐻p: 𝛽 = 0 𝐻p: 𝛽 ≠ 0 
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4 Empirical data 
The data used in this study is yearly self-reported price and sales data from Systembolaget 
(Systembolaget, n.d.-a) during the period 2009 to 2018. The number of observations before 
any modification of the data is 282,201. Even though the data was provided from the same 
source, the quality of the data was rather different during the time period. The data contains 
all the sold commodities from Systembolaget including bags, gift wrapping and deposit fees. 
The positive aspect is that all observations are the total number of actual purchases of each 
good, which give a true picture of the demand at Systembolaget and not aggregated data. The 
negative aspect for the purpose of this thesis is that this has caused a lot of data management 
with limited benefit to the final utilization of the data.  
In the data the prices are measured in Swedish Kronor, SEK per unit sold. The prices are 
constant and 2009 is used as base year using the consumer price index for Swedish 
consumption (SCB, 2019a). In order to avoid any misinterpretation, the variable was 
transformed into price per liter, therefore all prices presented are per liter. In the single 
equation model, the disposable income is accounted for, however not for 2018, since the data 
for 2018 are not yet available, will be available earliest at the end of June (SCB, 2019b). 
Two statistical programs were used in the study since each system more adaptive for each 
model. For the L/AIDS model, TSP 5.1 was used and for the Single equation model Stata 
15.1.  
4.1 Data management 
Before conducting the econometric analysis and cleaning of irrelevant observations, the 
number of observations was 282,201. But as mentioned above, some of these observations 
represented non-beverages and was therefore removed from the data. Observations with 
missing, zero or negative values for sales were removed, since these were considered to be 
typing errors that could produce unnecessary measurement errors. The dataset is an 
unbalanced dataset, meaning that all products did not have observations for each year. All 
observations for beer, spirits and non-alcoholic beverages were removed from the dataset, 
leaving 134,084 observations of wine.	
Since Systembolaget also sell products for importers, some observations had no information 
about what kind of commodity it concerned, nor any more information than the name, these 
observations were removed since the observations does not contain enough information in 
order to class them into commodity categories ie. beer, wine or spirits. This might exclude 
information that could have been included in the analysis and might generate a nontrivial bias 
(Afifi, Kotlerman, Ettner, & Cowan, 2007). However, adding these observations might have 
created other measurement errors if they were to be included. Furthermore, since they 
consisted of such a small part of the total sales, the choice was made to exclude them from the 
dataset. 	
Table 1 shows both the mean of price and the average sales in liters, over all varieties of wine, 
one can observe that the standard deviation of prices is fairly high, indicating skewness in the 
data.  
14 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics before outliers were removed 
Since the price of wine in the study varies from year to year and also across the varieties. To 
give an example of the price range figure 3 shows the distribution in 2009 for all five varieties 
of wine. Distribution curves for all years are found in the appendix. Figure 3 underline the 
skewness observed in the descriptive statistics.  
Figure 3 Distribution of prices in 2009 for all five wine categories 
In recent studies observations have been excluded with sales below 10 liters per year 
(Dahlström & Åsberg, 2009). Other studies have used similar data but only used the 
observations with 750 ml bottles (Cuellar et al., 2010). With hopes of removing an as small 
amount of observations as possible, observations were not removed from the dataset due to 
the sales nor what kind of bottle the beverages are sold in. This study keeps the observations 
which are within 2 ∗ 𝜎 from the mean, 95 percent for each commodity detail for each year to 
control for skewness. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics after the large outliers were 
Descriptive statistics before outliers were removed
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean 
Price per 
liter* 
413.7738 
(827.054) 
407.1572 
(773.9983) 
373.213 
(662.3717) 
388.1784 
(924.7472) 
382.4316 
(898.6481) 
378.8557 
(753.1491) 
393.8945 
(773.8938) 
392.1017 
(723.4539) 
397.311 
(718.1912) 
417.3975 
(832.188) 
Sales in liter 16226.45 (114272) 
16199.74 
(116189.5) 
16459.13 
(123063.8) 
15625.28 
(119242.9) 
14284.54 
(113765) 
13777.43 
(105977.1) 
13189.51 
(97888.57) 
13496.28 
(94765.65) 
13338.87 
(91768.73) 
14214.95 
(95335.19) 
Observations 11182 11599 11608 12451 13855 14358 14980 14764 14961 14326 
Standard deviation in parentheses. *Corrected for CPI 
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removed and comparing with table 1, an important change in both mean and standard 
deviation can be observed. The real price of wine decreased until 2014 when an increase in 
real prices can be observed until 2018. In figure 4 the distribution of price, the price range is 
less skewed. 
Descriptive statistics after outliers were removed
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean 
Price per 
liter* 
329.8709 
(372.0211) 
325.7897 
(358.2722) 
301.1605 
(320.358) 
297.6851 
(323.281) 
299.3935 
(331.0846) 
290.83 
(230.9638) 
299.577 
(233.6184) 
297.4682 
(227.6915) 
297.8785 
(218.2485) 
306.3083 
(230.769) 
Sales in liter 16145.03 (111763.2) 
15958.87 
(114539.5) 
15640.57 
(113608.6) 
14901.76 
(108341.5) 
12941.96 
(97507.68) 
12492.44 
(90942.79) 
12326.68 
(86170.16) 
13061.96 
(87543.77) 
12670.2 
(84134.7) 
13150.8 
(83016.84) 
Observations 10783 11194 11184 11992 13345 13762 14325 14104 14275 13653 
Standard deviation in parentheses. *Corrected for CPI 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics after outliers were removed 
Figure 4 Price distribution 2009, corrected for skewness 
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4.1.1 Creating an agregated data set 
This study assume that wine is a differentiated good, however it is difficult to differentiate 
over each observation of wine, why the total sales were used to estimate the demand for wine. 
The dataset was aggregated over each wine category per year and a pooled dataset of 50 
observations was created. With the total sales and simple average price and a weighted 
arithmetic mean which was calculated before the dataset was aggregated: 𝑠( = __a  (17) 𝑅 = 𝑝f𝑞f + ⋯+ 𝑝Z𝑞Z𝑖 = Observation of the unique product𝑐 = Variety, Sparkling, Rose, Red, White or Other wine𝑠( = Budget share∑ ln(𝑝() ∗ 𝑠( =	Z)D( ln	(pR∗)  (18) 
The aggregated data set is strongly balanced, since no observations are missing. The new 
dataset consists out of 5 groups and observations for 10 years, the number of observations is 
therefore 50.  
4.2 Limitations 
The data does not contain the degree of alcohol, and the levels of ethanol can therefore not be 
accounted for. Since the degree of ethanol is not provided in the dataset, the impact of tax 
changes to the demand for alcohol is not estimated. Due to the annual data, this study cannot 
control for differences in consumption patterns throughout the year. 	
This study uses sales data and not households or per capita consumption, the socio-economic 
perspective is not taken into account in the price elasticities estimates which have been raised 
as a problem when estimating price elasticities (Babor et al., 2010). However, this is 
suggested for further studies on the demand elasticities of Wine and alcohol in Sweden as 
supposed by Green & Alston (1990). No controls for regional differences in consumption will 
be accounted for since the dataset correspond only to the national sales of alcohol. 	
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5 Analysis and discussion 
In this chapter the results from the Single equation model will be discussed first followed by 
the results from the L/AIDS model to be concluded with a brief comparison between the 
results from the two models.  
5.1 Single equation model 
In total five models were estimated, in the first estimation it can be observed that the 
estimates for White and Other wine are not significant when included in the model. If the two 
categories are included in the intercept together with Red wine, as can be observed in the 
second regression. The own price elasticity for Sparkling is -1.227, for Rose wine -2.318 and 
the own price elasticity for the unobserved values, Red, White and other wine is -0.503. The 
demand for Sparkling and Rose is elastic since the own price elasticities in absolute terms are 
greater than one and significant at least at the 10 percent level. The clustered demand for Red, 
White and other is however inelastic and significant at the 1 percent level.  
Single equation model 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Ln(Sales) Ln(Sales) Ln(PC_Sales) Ln(PC_Sales) 
Ln(Price)° 1.167* 0.497*** 0.487*** 0.453** 
(0.601) (0.179) (0.180) (0.198) 
Sparkling -1.371** -0.724* -0.698* -0.252
(0.684) (0.395) (0.396) (0.442)
Rose wine -2.350*** -1.815*** -1.817*** -1.988**
(0.820) (0.651) (0.653) (0.812) 
White wine -0.759
(0.611)
Other wine 0.619
(0.882)
Sparkling dummy 4.232 1.486 1.363 -0.804
(3.004) (1.849) (1.856) (2.071)
Rose wine dummy 7.719** 5.425** 5.431** 6.135*
(3.455) (2.716) (2.726) (3.398)
White wine dummy 2.696 -0.486*** -0.492*** -0.527***
(2.584) (0.129) (0.130) (0.136) 
Other wine dummy -5.735 -2.629*** -2.625*** -2.607***
(3.957) (0.0935) (0.0938) (0.0992) 
Year 0.0583*** 0.0521*** 0.0416*** 0.0486 
(0.00865) (0.00833) (0.00836) (0.0410) 
Per capita income -8.74e-07
(4.53e-06)
Constant -99.40*** -84.02*** -79.11*** -92.75
(18.54) (17.07) (17.13) (81.85)
Observations 50 50 50 45 
Number of Commodity_detail 5 5 5 5 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
°Controlled for CPI, weighted arithmetic mean 
Table 3 Single equation model 
In regression 3-4 the Per capita sales are estimated. The outcome variable is therefore total per 
capita sales in natural log. The estimates do not vary a lot comparing to regression 1 and 2. 
The own price elasticity for Sparkling is --1,211, for Rose wine -2.33 and the own price 
elasticity for the reference group, Red, White and other wine is -0.513. The time effects seams 
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to capture the change in per capita income, since when adding the control variables Per capita 
income, none of the control variables are significant and however the estimated elasticity for 
Rose and the clustered elasticity show a marginal change, however, Sparkling becomes 
insignificant.  
5.2 LAIDS 
The Durbin Watson test for the Sparkling and Red are close but still not close enough in order 
to reject the autocorrelation. The Durbin Watson for Rose and White are relatively close to 2 
and autocorrelation can therefore be rejected. The adding up constraint is tested and satisfied, 
homogeneity is also tested and rejected for all except for Other, were homogeneity cannot be 
rejected. The R2 are relatively close to zero and indicates a somewhat fit model, even though, 
one should not put too much weight into the R2. 
Parameter estimates 
Sparkling Rose Red White 
Sparkling -0.05302**
-0.026198
Rose 0.025099** 0.072164* 
-0.011283 -0.038081
Red 0.046778* -0.013669 0.020861 
-0.028448 -0.02187 -0.037258
White -0.014566*** -1.22E-03 -0.034102*** 0.055552***
-3.71E-03 -7.12E-03 -7.15E-03 -2.25E-03
Total 
expenditure 0.138664*** 0.055479*** -0.144469*** -0.010714***
-0.020592 -8.21E-03 -0.021793 -2.74E-03
R2 0.832092 0.888832 0.825497 .991849 
Durbin Watson 1.2878 1.69692 1.12521 1.8722 
Table 4 Parameter estimates 
The Marshallian own price elasticities in Table 5 are negative and significant at the one 
percent level for Sparkling, Red and White. But positive for Rose respectively Other wine and 
statistically insignificant and significant at the 10 percent level respectively, Since all the 
Marshallian own price elasticities in, does not have negative estimates, we can conclude that 
this does not satisfy consumer theory (Edgerton et al., 1996). Reasons for this might be that 
the number of observations is fairly low and might lead to ambiguous results.  
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Elasticities for the Uncompensated and Compensated Model 
Sparkling Rose Red White Other 
Hicksian Price elasticities 
Sparkling -1.4261*** 0.311676** 1.00812*** 0.10188*** 4.43E-03
(0.26028) (0.112097) (0.282633) (0.036905) (0.078792) 
Rose 0.50339*** 0.220272 0.324031 0.227056** -1.27475**
(0.18105) (0.611046) (0.35093) (0.114297) (0.548251) 
Red 0.18674*** 3.72E-02 -0.418238*** 1.84E-01*** 0.010498
(0.05236) (0.040249) (0.068569) (0.013153) (0.027921) 
White 0.04159*** 5.74E-02** 0.405077*** -0.528128*** 0.024084 
(0.01506) (0.028886) (0.028982) (9.14E-03) (0.020767) 
Other 9.47E-03 -1.68806** 0.121209 0.126194 1.43119* 
(0.16761) (0.726755) (0.339085) (0.12057) (0.776677) 
Marshallian Price elasticities 
Sparkling -1.66542*** 0.163501 -0.283816 -0.484428*** -0.107467
(-0.26899) (-0.113673) (-0.265274) (-0.064646) (-0.077715) 
Rose 0.31313* 0.102472 -0.703053** -0.239058** -1.3637**
(-0.18366) (0.610648) (0.358242) (0.109814) (0.548689) 
Red 0.11285** -8.59E-03 -0.81714*** 2.80E-03 -0.024051
(0.05394) (0.040345) (0.066535) (0.016443) 0.027858) 
White -0.0547*** -2.23E-03 -0.114685*** -0.764008*** -0.020933
(0.01531) (0.2883) (0.029917) (8.80E-03) (0.020794) 
Other -7.86E-03 -1.69879** 0.027659 0.083739 1.42308* 
(0.16852) (0.726012) (0.322372) (0.108813) (0.777615) 
Expenditure elasticities 2.37763*** 1.89021*** 0.734125*** 0.956551*** 0.172166 
(0.204586) (0.131718) (0.040107) (0.011102) (0.120668) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5 AIDS - Price elasticities 
In table 5, representing the Uncompensated and Compensated model, the elasticities are 
calculated from budget share, which means that the elasticities does not imply that an increase 
in disposable income would increase the spending in quantity but increasing the budget share, 
as well as an increase in price is not associated with a decrease in quantity but a potential 
decrease in budget share. The demand for Sparkling is elastic since the estimate is greater 
than one in absolute terms. The demand for Red and White is price inelastic, meaning that 
consumers of Red and White wine are less responsive to price changes.  
For the Compensated elasticities, the own price elasticities are lower for the significant values 
than in the Uncompensated elasticities which is expected since the uncompensated elasticities 
result in more elastic estimates (Fogarty, 2009). The own-price elasticity estimates have the 
same elasticity as in the uncompensated estimates.  
For the cross-price elasticities however, the elasticities have a higher degree of statistically 
significant estimates. For Sparkling, Rose and White are net substitutes, and Red wine net 
complement differing from the Uncompensated model. For Rose, White is a net supplement 
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compared to the Uncompensated, where it is considered a compliment. For Red, Sparkling 
and White are net substitutes. For White, Sparkling, Rose and Red are considered net 
substitutes ranging from 5.74E-02 to 0.405077, except Other which is not statistically 
significant. Rose is a net complement for Other. When estimating the Hicksian demand, the 
utility is kept constant, the estimates represents the mean elasticities for the different varieties 
of the Swedish consumer.  
Concerning the cross-price elasticities in the Uncompensated model, only a few of them are 
statistically significant. For Sparkling, the estimate implies that White wine is a gross 
complement. For Rose, Sparkling is a gross substitute whereas Red, White and Other are 
gross complements. For Red, Sparkling is a gross substitute. For White, Sparkling and Red 
are gross complements. For Other, Rose is a gross complement. For the remaining estimates, 
were not statistically significant why no assumption regarding potential substitution or 
complementary effects can be made.  
The expenditure elasticities are all statistically significant, except for Other, the estimated 
elasticities for Sparkling and Rose, are greater than one indicating that both are luxury goods. 
Red is well below one, indicating that Red is a necessary good. The expenditure elasticity for 
White is very close to one indicating that it is very close to be considered a luxury good, 
however, it still falls into the category of a necessary good. The expenditure elasticities 
resembles the results shown by Carew et al. (2004) where White wine has a higher elasticity 
than Red wine. Dahlström & Åsberg (2009) argues that this is a result of shifts in the food 
consumption, since swedes tend to eat more shellfish and fish when income increases which 
may coincide with the consumption of White wine. 
The results for the estimates for own-price elasticities are not consistent over the two models, 
in the Single equation model, the demand for White, Rose and Sparkling are elastic whereas 
in the L/AIDS model, the demand for Rose and White are inelastic. L/AIDS have the imposed 
adding up, symmetry and homogeneity restrictions, not imposed in the Single equation model. 
The differences in the accuracy in the models have been discussed and argued that the Single 
equation model may lead to ambiguous results (Fogarty, 2009). By providing both results in 
this study capture that wine is a heterogenous good even at a color level, why a system 
approach is necessary to account for consumer demand.  
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6 Conclusions 
Over the time period studied, the numbers of choice for wine for the Swedish consumer have 
increased as well as the levels of total sales of wine. Using the system demand approach this 
study have shed light over the own price elasticities and cross price elasticities within wine. 
The results suggest that Sparkling and Rose are luxury goods, whereas red is a necessity and 
White wine is in an ambivalent zone between luxury and necessity. Concerning the cross-
price elasticities, the compensated and uncompensated estimates varied quite substantially, 
which may depend on lack of observations or the limitation of time. The demand for Red and 
White wine is inelastic which implies that consumers are not sensitive regarding changes in 
price whereas the demand for Sparkling is elastic and is more sensitive to price changes. To 
decrease the consumption in order to achieve the WHO goals for 2025 it might be interesting 
to look further into the elasticities of demand across varieties in order to go about the 
substitution effects. Since sensibility in prices may affect policy outcome, in order to estimate 
potential tax implications, accessibility for the ethanol data is required for further studies.  
The two approaches toward the demand of wine shows that a Single equation model does not 
manage to capture the differences within the varieties of wine, why a system demand, is more 
relevant to apply to such a heterogeneous good. However, including more control variables 
such as organic, vintage and quality factors using ethanol levels, would acquire a more in 
depth understanding of the wine market in Sweden.  
The quality of data for similar demand estimations have been discussed and in order to 
analyze the demand for wine as well as other alcoholic beverages in comparison with other 
food stuff, the data needs to be more detailed and collectable in the same place. Which would 
open up for more analysis regarding consumption patterns and taxation.  
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Figure 20 Price distribution 2016 - Corrected for skewness 
 Figure 21 Price distribution 2017 - Corrected for skewness 
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Figure 22 Price distribution 2018 - Corrected for skewness 
Fixed effect 
VARIABLES Sparkling Rose Red White Other 
LN(Simple  
mean price)° 
0.323 -5.132 -0.147 1.522** 0.389*
(0.338) (4.511) (0.189) (0.634) (0.192) 
Year 0.128*** 0.254 0.0148*** 0.00228 -0.0110*** 
(0.00900) (0.139) (0.00213) (0.0109) (0.00310) 
Constant -238.0*** -465.3 -6.121 9.335 40.33*** 
(19.85) (257.6) (4.713) (19.36) (6.793) 
Observations 10 10 10 10 10 
R-squared 0.988 0.910 0.890 0.715 0.801 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 °Controlled for CPI 
Table 6 Single equation - Simple mean 
